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The foundation for Georgia’s Golden Age was laid by King Bagrat III (r.1008-1014), who succeeded by luck and ruthlessness in exploiting the opportunities for Georgian unification. He was a member of the Bagrationi dynasty that had ruled Kartli – the central part of today’s Georgia – since the early 9th century AD. Born in c.AD 960, he was the designated heir to Kartli and had some claims to Abkhazia, a region to the north-west. Prince Bagrat had seized his chance when the childless ruler Davit (David) III of Tao (in today’s south-western Georgia and north-eastern Turkey), adopted and installed him in 978 as king of Abkhazia. Impatient to inherit Tao, Bagrat attacked his adoptive father in 989. However, Davit managed to stall Bagrat’s assault and even, against his better judgement, pardoned him. Twelve years later, Davit was assassinated by means of poisoned altar wine, a murder that was masterminded either by his treacherous adoptive son or by the Byzantine emperor Basil II. When Bagrat’s biological father, Gurgen of Kartli, died in 1008, he was able to unite Kartli, Kakheti, Abkhazia, and North Tao to form the Kingdom of Georgia, locally called Sakartvelo, ‘Land of Kartvelians’. Even so, Bagrat had to yield the major part of Tao to Byzantium, which aspired to bring all of Georgia within its orbit. In the event, an emerging power soon neutralised the Byzantine menace, but also proved an even greater challenge for the newly independent Georgian state.
The Seljuk threat
This new power was the Turkic Seljuks, who arrived from the steppes of today’s Turkmenistan, and soon threatened Byzantium’s eastern flank. The Seljuk menace prevented Byzantium from exploiting rivalries among Bagrat’s descendants. In 1064, the Seljuk sultan Alp Arslan conquered the important Armenian city of Ani, which Byzantium had acquired in 1045, and looted southern Georgia, an act fomenting a war that lasted almost 60 years between Georgia and the Seljuks. In 1071, Alp Arslan destroyed the Byzantine army at the Battle of Manzikert, which as far as Georgia was concerned, eliminated the Byzantine danger. From 1077 onwards, though, armed Seljuk bands raided Georgia annually and carried its young people off into slavery. Not even the humiliating capitulation of King Giorgi II (r.1072-1089) in 1083 and payment of tribute could put an end to the depredations. For the kingdom to survive, something had to change, and in 1089 Giorgi was forced to abdicate in favour of his young son, Davit IV (r.1089-1125), who was later given the epithet Aghmashenebeli, ‘the Builder’ or ‘Restorer’. Indeed, in due course, Davit restored the economy, introduced functioning state institutions, and built Georgia into a fully sovereign and territorially compact kingdom secured by a strong standing army.
Yet when Davit assumed power, he controlled only Egrisi and Abkhazia; that is, western Georgia. Luckily for Davit, both the bellicose Seljuk sultan Malik Shah and the mastermind of the Seljuk Empire, Vizier Nizam al-Mulk, died in 1092, whereupon the sultanate was plunged into a 13-year internal power struggle. Soon after, the Crusaders’ attacks, beginning in the summer of 1097 and culminating with the capture of Jerusalem in 1099, further rocked the Seljuk Empire. Davit raised a 5,000-strong royal guard, cleared Kartli of marauding Seljuk bands, and then stopped the tribute payments, before destroying the resulting punitive Seljuk expedition at the Battle of Ertsukhi in 1104. As a next step, the king put an end to the cronyism and nepotistic relationship that existed between the gentry and church. To clean up the corrupt Augean Stable that was the Georgian Church, Davit had unworthy prelates defrocked, and introduced rules including a minimum age and qualification criteria for priestly ordination and appointment to bishoprics. The king went on to reorganise the government into ministries, create a domestic and foreign intelligence service, and – in order to secure a pool of well-educated clergymen and future scientists – to establish in 1106 the monastery of Gelati and the academy of Ikalto. Here, the curriculum included not only ecclesiastical subjects and philosophy, but also mathematics, geometry, astronomy, rhetoric, and even handicrafts. At the same time, an ambitious construction program for churches and monasteries commenced, and would endure until the Mongol invasions. An impressive example of Davit’s ambition can still be seen in the monastery and educational centre of Gelati, in the Imereti region, which contains a 16th-century mural featuring its founder.
Once Davit had laid the foundations for a stable state, he devoted himself to foreign policy and conquests. He seized the opportunity to strengthen his armed forces in 1118, when the Turkic Kipchaks, who had been evicted from the Lower Don region, were seeking a new homeland. Since they were famous horsemen, Davit invited 40,000 families to Georgia, on the condition that each family supplied him with a mounted and fully equipped warrior. Davit now commanded an elite guard of 5,000 men, 40,000 Kipchak horsemen, and local border garrisons. This strengthening of the military proved decisive in consolidating Georgia’s sovereignty. After the Seljuk sultan Mahmud II bin Muhammad formed a broad Muslim coalition against Georgia, he met a Georgian-Kipchak force allegedly numbering some 56,000 men at Didgori, west of Tbilisi on 12 August 1121. Thanks to Davit’s superior tactics, he achieved an overwhelming victory against an army said to be three to five times as large, thus securing Georgia’s sovereignty and dominance in the southern Caucasus from the Black Sea to the Caspian for a full century. Modern visitors to the Didgori battlefield will find colossal sculptures standing sentinel over the site of this pivotal victory.
As a result of this victory, Davit gained full control of the Muslim Emirate of Tbilisi in 1122. In order not to jeopardise the value of his conquest – Tbilisi was an important economic centre and trading hub – Davit guaranteed Tbilisi’s Muslim population their freedom of religion and even granted them preferential taxation. Soon after, Davit also brought Shirvan, a large part of today’s Azerbaijan, and Derbent (today’s eastern Dagestan) under Georgian control. In surface area, Davit’s Georgia was at its height about five times as large as today’s republic. Finally, Davit conquered Ani. When he died in 1125, Davit went down in history as undefeated; he was buried in the monastery of Gelati.
Divine rule
Davit’s son and successor Demetre I (r.1125-1154/55, 1155-1156) faced efforts by the subjugated Muslim emirs to regain their independence, as well as revolts within his own family. In late 1154 or early 1155 he found himself banished to a monastery by his rebellious son Davit V (r.1154/55-1156) who was soon murdered by his brother Giorgi (or by his father Demetre, or both). It was under Giorgi III (r.1156-1184) that the famous cathedral of Samtavisi was consecrated in 1168. Although he managed to suppress several rebellions, his position remained precarious, especially as he had no male heir. To secure his line and bring stability, in 1178 he crowned his daughter Tamar as co-ruler (1178-1184, r.1184-1213). Any questions in terms of army leadership and prestige arising from contemporary views of her gender were offset by panegyrics, which elevated her to quasi-divine status. In an early 13th-century chronicle, Tamar was even hailed the ‘fourth member of the Holy Trinity’. Unlike preceding kings, Tamar’s legitimacy lay not in military virtues, but her alleged divinity. A mural dating from the early part of Tamar’s reign at the Vardzia Cave Monastery in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region shows her holding a miniature church, illustrating that she also acted as a patron of the church.
Despite Tamar’s credentials, her accession to the throne was soon challenged by a coalition of rebellious nobles. Thanks to her diplomatic skills, Tamar succeeded in quelling the revolt. Even so, the darbazi – state council – forced her to marry the Rus prince Yuri Bogolyubsky (king consort 1185-1188). The childless marriage was a failure and annulled in 1188. Next choice for the darbazi was the Alanian prince Davit Soslan (king consort c.1189-1207), from which marriage the future king Giorgi IV Lasha and the future queen Rusudan were born. Strengthened by her second marriage, Tamar filled the high offices of the kingdom with men she could trust. Most significantly, she nominated two Armenian brothers, probably of Kurdish stock, to key positions: Zakare Mkhargrdzeli became supreme army commander, while his younger brother Ivane was named lord chamberlain. The hereditary Haghartsin monastery of the Mkhargrdzeli family, which bears a relief of the brothers, can still be seen in what is now the Tavush Province of Armenia. With these appointments, Tamar reasserted her authority. As it turned out, though, this concentration of power in the hands of the Mkhargrdzeli brothers would ultimately, after Tamar’s death, undermine the kingdom’s unity.
In the next two decades, the Mkhargrdzeli brothers and king consort Davit Soslan not only reconquered all the territories that had been lost since Davit IV’s death, but successfully expanded westward as far as Trebizond (Trabzon), southward almost to Lake Van and eastward towards Iranian Azerbaijan. However, these Georgian conquests really represented a quasi-Armenian reconquest, since the territories of the former Armenian kingdoms, which had disappeared in 1021, 1045, and 1065 respectively, were captured by the Armenian Mkhargrdzeli brothers and not firmly integrated into the Georgian kingdom. Instead, regency over them was transferred to the Mkhargrdzelis, who established a kind of autonomous and prosperous state within the Georgian kingdom. While the brothers remained loyal to Queen Tamar, they ruled their conquests like viceroys and enjoyed significantly greater autonomy than Georgian nobles. Among their acts was to found the cathedral of the impressive fortified monastery of Harichavank in 1201. When Zakare Mkhargrdzeli died in 1212 (or late 1211), leaving behind one son called Shanshe, Tamar elevated his brother Ivane to the rank of atabeg. After the death of Tamar in 1213, though, cracks opened up in the close relationship between the royal Bagrationis and the Mkhargrdzelis. The Mkhargrdzelis proclaimed their ambitions in an inscription at Haghartsin monastery, by claiming descent from the vanished royal Armenian Bagratunis: a sister branch of the Georgian royal family. It is possible that the Mkhargrdzelis would have attempted to separate from Georgia and resurrect the former Armenian kingdoms of Ani and Vashpurakan, had not the Mongols shattered both powers.
Tamar had named her son, Giorgi IV, co-ruler after Davit Soslan’s death in 1207. Tamar then almost vanishes from historical records until her death six years later. Sadly for Georgia, the two monarchs that followed Tamar were by turns reckless and indulgent. These failings weakened the loyalty of their closest associates, threatening the nation’s unity. As king, Giorgi IV (r.1213-1223), called ‘Lasha’ – the ‘Resplendent’ – quickly alienated the darbazi and senior army commanders with his headstrong and dissolute behaviour: in battle, he took unnecessary, costly risks; at home, he ousted experienced ministers and surrounded himself with drinking companions. He also took a commoner as mistress, whose son Davit was rejected as future heir by the darbazi. Although Giorgi rectified his behaviour to some extent, the common interests between king and feudal nobility had been disrupted, and the feudal lords began to look for ways to expand their power – particularly the atabeg Ivane.
A new enemy
It was in late autumn 1220 that a previously unknown enemy appeared from the east. This took the form of two of Genghis Khan’s best noyans (generals), Sübotai and Jebe, who were pursuing the Shah of Khwarazm, ‘Ala al-Din Muhammad II. According to Ibn al-Athir, a Muslim chronicler who witnessed the events, on three occasions the Mongols inflicted severe defeats on larger Georgian armies led by Giorgi IV. Giorgi himself died in January 1223, possibly from wounds suffered in battle. He was succeeded by his sister Rusudan (r.1223-1245), who seems to have been more interested in pleasure-seeking than affairs of state. Disaster struck again in 1225 when Shah Jalal al-Din Manguberni of Khwarazm, son of ‘Ala al-Din Muhammad II, managed to rebuild a power base in north-western Iran and occupy Tabriz. This made a clash with Georgia inevitable. The Georgians assembled an army of 60,000 men, but there was disunity within their command. Ivane Mkhargrdzeli, who led the main force, was jealous of the leaders of the vanguard, the brothers Toreli-Akhaltsikheli. When the outnumbered Georgian vanguard came under pressure at the Battle of Garni in Armenia, the main army under Ivane left the field without engaging the enemy. As a result, the Toreli brothers were killed, while the main army suffered heavy losses during the retreat. A few months later, in March 1226, the strongly fortified city of Tbilisi fell by treachery and there was a massacre. Queen Rusadan had previously fled to Kutaisi. In the end it was a Mongol army under noyan Chormaghun that managed to crush Jalal al-Din and eject the Khwarazmian marauders from Georgia, thereby buying it a few years’ respite.
For Georgia, the first Mongol and the Khwarazmian invasions were disastrous. The army was significantly weakened, while its vassals in today’s Azerbaijan sided with the aggressors. Even worse, Queen Rusudan and her court abandoned central and eastern Georgia to their fates. Rather than attempting a coordinated defence, local nobles were simply left on their own. The disappearance of the queen and a unified command dissolved the bonds of loyalty towards the central authorities. With few options left, nobles and their small armies retreated to strong fortresses in the hope of weathering the storm. As a tactic, it failed. When the Mongols led by Chormaghun resumed their attacks on Georgia in early 1236, he offered attractive terms to nobles willing to submit to him: their personal security was guaranteed and they could keep their domains, provided they swore an oath of allegiance to the Great Khan, delivered hostages (usually their sons), provided provisions for the occupying troops, paid taxes, and provided soldiers for the Mongols’ endless wars. Senior local rulers were also required to present themselves at the Mongol court in Karakorum in distant Mongolia.
The first high Georgian noble to capitulate in 1236 was the commander Avag Mkhargrdzeli, son of Ivane. Avag’s possessions were duly confirmed, but he was forced to participate with his own troops in the Mongol attack on Ani, which belonged to his cousin Shanshe Mkhargrdzeli. So it was that the son of Ivane Mkhargrdzeli had to fight the son of Zakare Mkhargrdzeli – meaning the Mongol conquest became a Georgian civil war. It was Avag who prevailed, and after the destruction of Ani he continued supporting the Mongol cause, with one castle after another surrendering to it. As a Mongol vassal, Avag quickly became the de facto ruler of central Georgia and former Armenia.
Queen Rusudan was well protected in the densely forested refuges of the Svaneti and Imereti regions, as the Mongol cavalry could not operate there. Even so, Rusudan accepted Avag’s recommendation to submit to the Mongols, thereby ensuring the recognition of her son Davit. He was then sent to Karakorum for imperial approval. By acknowledging Rusudan’s submission, the Mongols introduced a dual regime insofar as they recognised the institution of royal rule, but at the same time promoted regionalisation by conferring the status of autonomous vassals on cooperative nobles. When Rusudan died in 1245, her son had not yet returned and was presumed dead. The nobles therefore resigned themselves to accept Giorgi’s illegitimate son Davit. He, too, was dispatched to Karakorum, where the two Davits met at the Mongol court. The Great Khan Güyük (r.1246-1248) recognised both and ranked them by seniority: Giorgi Lasha’s son became Davit VII (r.1247-1270, from 1259/62 in east Georgia only), called ‘Ulu’ (senior); and Rusudan’s son Davit VI (r.1247-1293, from 1258/9 in Imereti and Abkhazia only), called ‘Narin’ (junior). Both would reign, but Davit Ulu would be nominally the higher ranking.
Georgia divided
Georgia was now divided into three: In the forested western part, Davit VI ruled quite independently, whereas in central and eastern Georgia power was divided between Davit VII and those nobles that had been confirmed by the Great Khan. The days of Georgian unity and independence were gone. Worse was to come, as in 1262 the southern Caucasus became a battleground between two antagonistic Mongol royal branches, the Il-Khans and the Golden Horde. It was only in 1328, when the Mongol Il-Khanid dynasty was rapidly declining, that Giorgi V (second reign 1314-1346) succeeded in shaking off the Mongol fetters and restoring Georgia’s independence, albeit on a much-reduced scale. From this period of brief Georgian renaissance stems the Astvatsatsin Church of Noravank. But two other catastrophes struck Georgia soon afterwards, namely the Black Death in the late 1340s, and, less than four decades later, the systematic destruction wrought by Timur e-Lang, founder of the Timurid Empire. Nevertheless, even in these troubled periods, churches were built and embellished, like the murals in the St Giorgi church of Ubisa made in the Byzantine Palaiologic style. Georgia’s unity was destroyed for good when king Aleksandr I (r.1412-1442) nominated four of his five sons joint kings. After 50 years of conflict between Aleksandr’s sons and their descendants, in 1491 the darbazi divided Georgia into three independent kingdoms and one principality. These swiftly broke into three kingdoms and five principalities. It was only in 1918 that Georgia’s political unity and independence were briefly restored, before being lost again in 1921 to Soviet Russia, and then regained in 1991.
FURTHER READING:
For a comprehensive history of Georgia and the Caucasus, see Christoph Baumer’s two-volume History of the Caucasus, published by I B Tauris in 2021 and 2023 (ISBN 978-1788310079 and ISBN 978-0755636280).
Images: © Christoph Baumer, unless otherwise stated
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