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REVIEW BY ANDREW MULHOLLAND
History is usually about people, while military strategy tends not to be, and can sometimes seem rather dry. This book by Phillips O’Brien reminds us that it is leaders who actually determine strategy, with all of their strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, it is useful to consider the strategic history of a given conflict through the lens of the leaders involved.
This is what O’Brien has attempted for World War II, in a book that is part biography, part psychological profile, and part strategic history. For most of the conflict that is, as this is not a strategic history of the entire war: it does not, for example, address Japan’s leadership during that time. Rather, its subject matter is confined to the contribution of five leaders: Churchill, Hitler, Mussolini, Roosevelt, and Stalin. In terms of military ideas and strategy, O’Brien is interested in what forged these individuals and how their personalities affected their strategic choices. And it is intriguing stuff.
O’Brien is Professor of Strategy at the University of St Andrews, and his most notable work is 2015’s How the War was Won. He is also well known as a podcaster, blogger, and acerbic commentator on events in Ukraine. His writing has focused on the 20th century, particularly naval and air strategy. Controversially, he has argued that, during this period, upstream strategies that focused on degrading an enemy’s ability to fight were much more decisive than events on the battlefield. He now turns to the human factor.
The book begins with a crisp definition of strategy itself, which O’Brien regards as ‘an implemented decision which starts a dynamic process’. That will do nicely, for there are dozens of books that pick this apart as an issue. At least we know what he means, and, in any case, his focus is on how these five specific characters addressed it.
The book is deftly structured, beginning with the early lives of those covered, and introducing the experiences and characteristics which, he argues, would later form them as strategists. Much of this will be familiar ground to MHM readers, but the specific focus is different.
In this way, Hitler – already an embittered and unbalanced young man – is exposed to sustained frontline experience on the Western Front during World War I. O’Brien argues that, as well as prompting his famous ‘stab in the back’ paranoia, this period gave Hitler undue focus on the tactical and, in particular, on the supposedly superior German weapons systems. We all know where that led.
From these early sketches, which include Stalin’s role during the Russian Civil War and equivalent formative episodes for the others, the book moves through the interwar period, again examining each of them as they secure leadership positions and begin to act as strategists.
Roosevelt, always fascinated by naval affairs and Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the First World War, managed as President to incorporate a shipbuilding programme into his ‘New Deal’. During his second term in the White House, although mindful of the US public’s isolationist sentiments, he continued with this, and invested heavily in air power, too. In terms of force structure – and thereby strategy – the US was well prepared for what was to come.
Leadership styles
As the book moves into the Second World War, we see these ideas play out, along with the differing leadership styles that accompanied them. The approach is to take large slices of history and to describe them in terms of the opposing leaders and their decisions.
So there is, for example, a chapter on ‘Churchill, Hitler, and the Battle of Britain’ and one on ‘Stalin, Hitler, and Barbarossa’. In Barbarossa, Hitler’s overconfidence, micro-management, and sadism are juxtaposed with similar traits in Stalin, offset by the latter’s clear ability to learn on the job.
O’Brien’s powerful point about force structures reflecting strategic outlook becomes a useful analytical tool. Thus a Luftwaffe designed as flying artillery is unable to fulfil a strategic role, and Hitler’s obsession with big tanks compromises German production. The book remains loosely chronological, which is helpful, but its purpose is not to narrate the war.
Similarly, the biographical sections are by no means exhaustive. There is nothing on Churchill’s role as Home Secretary, nor Mussolini’s relationship with the Catholic Church. Again, this is not the purpose. But when it comes to these leaders as military strategists, the biographical detail is meticulous and the analysis impressive. O’Brien is very good at drawing psychological and strategic conclusions about his subjects, both from their earlier lives and from their conduct during the Second World War.
He is controversial at times, but the arguments are well evidenced and ultimately persuasive. He is also witty, winking at current events – having a pop at academic grade inflation, or (for his British audience) referring to ‘so-called experts’. His revisionist upstream views on strategy naturally inform the argument as well, especially when describing the ‘air-sea super battlefield’, which, for O’Brien, was decisive.
Indeed, this book neatly complements the author’s other volume on the strategy of the Second World War. Frankly, it is also much more engaging for the non-specialist reader, with its emphasis on personality. There is no blood and guts here, though: the book is not tactical in any way, and it eschews detailed accounts of battle. It won’t be for everyone, but, for those who enjoy a bird’s-eye view of 20th century conflict, with thought-provoking discussion on the whys and hows – and also the personalities – it will be difficult to put down.
This is a new way of looking at strategy; by insisting that in practice it is a fundamentally personal phenomenon, as well as a social science. Sadly, we don’t need to look far to recognise this in current events. It is therefore an important contribution, both as history and as an aid to policymakers. Anyone interested in military strategy will enjoy it, as will many who might think strategy too dry.
The Strategists: Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, Mussolini and Hitler
Phillips Payson O’Brien
Viking, hbk, 544pp (£25)
ISBN 978-0241696323
