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REVIEW BY ANDREW MULHOLLAND
History is usually about people, while military strategy tends not to be, and can sometimes seem rather dry. This book by Phillips O’Brien reminds us that it is leaders who actually determine strategy, with all of their strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, it is useful to consider the strategic history of a given conflict through the lens of the leaders involved.
This is what O’Brien has attempted for World War II, in a book that is part biography, part psychological profile, and part strategic history. For most of the conflict that is, as this is not a strategic history of the entire war: it does not, for example, address Japan’s leadership during that time. Rather, its subject matter is confined to the contribution of five leaders: Churchill, Hitler, Mussolini, Roosevelt, and Stalin. In terms of military ideas and strategy, O’Brien is interested in what forged these individuals and how their personalities affected their strategic choices. And it is intriguing stuff.
O’Brien is Professor of Strategy at the University of St Andrews, and his most notable work is 2015’s How the War was Won. He is also well known as a podcaster, blogger, and acerbic commentator on events in Ukraine. His writing has focused on the 20th century, particularly naval and air strategy. Controversially, he has argued that, during this period, upstream strategies that focused on degrading an enemy’s ability to fight were much more decisive than events on the battlefield. He now turns to the human factor.
The book begins with a crisp definition of strategy itself, which O’Brien regards as ‘an implemented decision which starts a dynamic process’. That will do nicely, for there are dozens of books that pick this apart as an issue. At least we know what he means, and, in any case, his focus is on how these five specific characters addressed it.

The book is deftly structured, beginning with the early lives of those covered, and introducing the experiences and characteristics which, he argues, would later form them as strategists. Much of this will be familiar ground to MHM readers, but the specific focus is different.
In this way, Hitler – already an embittered and unbalanced young man – is exposed to sustained frontline experience on the Western Front during World War I. O’Brien argues that, as well as prompting his famous ‘stab in the back’ paranoia, this period gave Hitler undue focus on the tactical and, in particular, on the supposedly superior German weapons systems. We all know where that led.
From these early sketches, which include Stalin’s role during the Russian Civil War and equivalent formative episodes for the others, the book moves through the interwar period, again examining each of them as they secure leadership positions and begin to act as strategists.
