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Students of military history find much to fascinate in the subject: strategy, tactics, weapons, uniforms, battles, and the lives of the great generals. Exactly how wars come about and the ethics of combat may seem secondary issues, yet they are woven into the history: massacres of civilians, execution of prisoners, violations of neutrality, and treacherous surprise attacks all arouse strong feelings, because our instinct is to expect boundaries and rules even in the hell of war.
Written nearly 50 years ago, Walzer’s book is a compelling update to the Classical concept of the ‘just war’. This stands on two key principles: jus ad bellum, which defines the right to begin a war, and jus in bello, which governs the way wars are conducted. As Walzer says, ‘War is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt.’ As he points out with numerous examples, a just cause doesn’t always imply adherence to the rules, or vice-versa. Walzer is accused of being vague about the basis of this set of rules, which he calls ‘The War Convention’. In essence, this posits that soldiers are free – even obliged – to kill other combatants, but that civilians should as far as possible be spared, along with soldiers who are rendered defenceless by wounds or who have surrendered.
Citing US General William Tecumseh Sherman’s 1864 burning of Atlanta, and his infamous quote ‘war is hell’, Walzer considers and dismisses the notion that war is so abhorrent that it cannot be governed by rules. Sherman contended that wars must be concluded as quickly as possible, by whatever means. Walzer also clearly sets out the principle of the integrity of sovereign states, and their right to defend themselves against aggression. But he recognises that the reality can be complex. For example, Bismarck and an expansionist Prussia persuaded a gullible Napoleon III to initiate war – and then executed a well-planned invasion of France. He considers appeasement, too, as a strategy for weak powers. Finland in 1939 was offered a land-swap by Russia in return for pulling its borders back from Leningrad. Finland opted to fight, fearing further land-grabs. Defeated in 1940, they lost even more land than the original deal set out, but their doughty fight salvaged national honour, and no doubt informed their strategy of joining NATO in 2023 after Ukraine’s own plucky stand.
‘Preventive’ wars, pre-emptive strikes, civil wars, and foreign interventions are all considered and placed in an ethical context. With sentences like ‘I can now restate the fifth revision of the legalist paradigm’, this is not a book for the faint-hearted, but its relevance to today’s complex world is greater than ever. The language of war may change (for example ‘Special Military Operation’), but the cases and examples cited cover every permutation of conflict.
Fighting fair
Nearly two-thirds of the book is devoted to the way wars are fought, and the detailed examples give this an immediacy that the first part lacks. Walzer states that ‘soldiers are subject to attack at any time’ – never more true than in Ukraine, where the drone revolution makes nowhere safe. How does the drone operator feel when he or she sees the final moment of terror as a soldier is chased and hit? Walzer cites five historic examples of individual soldiers who are spared by snipers because they are suddenly revealed as human and vulnerable. Bathing, lighting a cigarette, and even basking in spring sunshine are cited as cases where killing feels too much like murder.
Of course, it is the status of non-combatants that is most controversial. The principle of ‘double effect’ recognises that a good effect (the destruction of military supplies, or the effective progress of a friendly force through a heavily defended area) may encompass an evil effect – the loss of civilian life. Walzer quotes the memoirs of veteran Frank Richards (see MHM 143), in which he says he nearly ‘innocently murdered’ a French family when lobbing grenades into cellars in an assault on a village. The safest course for the soldiers was simply to throw the bombs; Richards chose to call a warning. This encapsulates the dilemma that following the ‘War Convention’ is risky for soldiers, while the safest option (for example, blanket bombardment) risks ‘collateral damage’, to use the modern term.
War is judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt.
There are cases where such damage has always been recognised as inevitable – for example, sieges. The sieges of Jerusalem (AD 70) and Leningrad (1941-1944) are considered as cases where the attacker benefited from trapping thousands of hapless civilians who competed (usually unsuccessfully) for the same food as the garrison. Wilhelm von Leeb, who commanded the forces besieging Leningrad, threatened to shoot down any Russian civilian trying to escape through German lines. He was acquitted of war crimes at Nuremberg because the judges recognised that there were plenty of historical precedents – including Jerusalem.
Britain is not spared ethical scrutiny: arguably the naval blockade of Germany in World War I was the greatest siege in history, and the most effective. The appalling levels of malnutrition and disease eroded the national will to fight on. Of course, the German High Command would happily have seen the same happen to Britain if their U-boat blockade had gone according to plan.
Resistance and reprisal
Partisan warfare, terrorism, and reprisals are all considered in detail, and Walzer’s systematic and logical approach helps to untangle the ethics of these very complex problems. Of partisan warfare, he recognises that ‘resistance is legitimate, and the punishment of resistance is legitimate’. Guerrilla fighters may literally drop their farm implements, pick up weapons, and massacre a military unit, as in a famous case where 14 German soldiers were killed, but execution is a reasonable consequence as they have not identified themselves as combatants. It also raises difficult issues of how to deal with civilians who shelter them. A general insurrection, as in Yugoslavia, may result in partisans wearing uniform and to some degree fitting into the War Convention.
A helpful distinction from terrorism is this: partisans aim to kill military occupiers, and possibly selected officials who have chosen to collaborate with them. By contrast, ‘randomness is the crucial feature of terrorist activity’. Soft, non-military targets are deliberately chosen to generate a general sense of insecurity, creating political pressure.
The mass bombing of German cities was initially justified as a reprisal for the bombing of British cities in 1940. Then it was continued because no other counter-attack option was available, at least on the Continent. But Walzer argues that, once Germany was in withdrawal and clearly destined for defeat, the continued mass killing of German civilians could not be justified. The virtual ostracism of Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris and his crews after the war reflects Winston Churchill’s belated recognition of this. Walzer extends this moral uncertainty to the nuclear deterrent. He acknowledges that it seems to work, but insists that an alternative should be found. His final chapter, on non-violent resistance, reflects his pacifist values, but he acknowledges that a figure like Gandhi could never have operated in a country where secret police spirited people away in the dead of night.
Walzer’s work remains hugely influential and his principles are still quoted by leaders contemplating war. He draws on a Western liberal consensus about human rights that many argue has no objective basis, but looking at today’s troubled world his book poses the challenge: ‘Can we not do better than this?’
Michael Walzer
Born: 3 March 1935
Age: 91
Nationality: American
Michael Walzer is an American theorist and academic best known for his work on political ethics and moral philosophy. Following his studies at Brandeis University, the University of Cambridge, and Harvard University, Walzer taught at Princeton University and Harvard before going on to work for many years in the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, where he is now a Professor Emeritus. Walzer also served for decades as co-editor of the political journal Dissent, and has written books and essays on a wide variety of topics, including war, nationalism and ethnicity, economic justice, and the welfare state. Just and Unjust Wars, published in 1977, is now considered a standard work in the philosophical literature on the ethics of warfare.
