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REVIEW BY JONATHAN EATON
Sir Max Hastings has an established reputation as a leading writer on 20th-century conflicts, drawing on his previous experience as both a war correspondent and newspaper editor. His recent works have included studies of Vietnam and the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as a series of well-received treatments on aspects of the Second World War. His latest book returns to that period with a focus on the 1942 commando raid codenamed Operation Biting.
The context of this raid lies in Winston Churchill’s enthusiasm for the use of new forces and tactics to maintain the pressure on German occupying forces on mainland Europe, even after the withdrawal at Dunkirk. This was famously outlined in a memorandum from Churchill to his chief of staff, Major General Hastings ‘Pug’ Ismay, dated 4 June 1940, in which the then-Prime Minister argued emphatically for learning the lessons of the Dunkirk evacuation. Churchill was keen on the potential of forces that could be rapidly deployed, withdrawn, and then redeployed in an offensive manner in order to confuse and harass the enemy.
Part of Churchill’s genius, particularly during the darkest periods of the conflict from a British perspective, lay in his active encouragement of his military commanders to see beyond the immediate threat and use unorthodox approaches to gain an advantage. As Churchill articulated shortly after, he sought plans for ‘a vigorous, enterprising, and ceaseless offensive against the whole German-occupied coastline’. This approach would not only keep German forces in a state of confusion and imbalance, but it would also serve to shore up British morale. It is noteworthy that Operation Biting itself took place in the same month as the surrender of Singapore and the evasion by German battlecruisers of the Royal Navy in the so-called ‘Channel Dash’, a period where good news was anxiously sought by the British military command.
Bringing Churchill’s vision to life required the creation of a new Combined Operations function, ultimately led by Lord Louis Mountbatten. Combined Ops was created to draw together the necessary talent, resources, and matériel to launch raids on the coast of occupied Europe, through liaison with the existing armed forces and intelligence services. As a new entity with a radical approach to fighting the war, the existence of Combined Ops was a source of political tension at the highest levels of the military, not helped in the least by a lack of confidence in some quarters in the proposed approach. Churchill’s appointment of Mountbatten explicitly created a leader with the political connections, reputation, and charisma to drive the concept forward and deliver results.
The Chief of Combined Operations was utterly reliant on the resources provided (sometimes grudgingly) by the Armed Services, and therefore successful leadership required the ability to influence and persuade at the highest levels. Mountbatten’s political connections, stemming from his relationship with the royal family, were exceptionally broad. Indeed, the German Luftwaffe officer responsible for the radar installation targeted by Biting was a distant cousin of Mountbatten, a descendant of Queen Victoria, and grandson of the last Kaiser.
Bruneval identified
In the early years of the war, suspicions began to grow among some members of the British scientific intelligence community that German radar capabilities were advancing significantly. At the heart of this theory was Dr R V Jones, Assistant Director of Intelligence (Science) at the Air Ministry. With a deep passion for scientific research into radar, Jones was well connected across the wider intelligence community and a firm advocate of the use of science to further the Allied war effort. Using his access to aerial photography of German installations and signal intercepts, Jones theorised that the enemy’s radar capabilities were at risk of matching or exceeding those of Britain.
Further intensive aerial photography collation and analysis identified the area at Bruneval in Normandy as a potential site for a raid to recover key components of a German radar system, owing to its proximity to the coast and natural topography. Local intelligence on the composition and deployment of forces and defensive features was also secured through considerable personal bravery by agents of the French Resistance.
In the decades before the outbreak of war, Britain fell significantly behind Germany and Russia in the establishment of airborne assault forces. Early German successes appeared to demonstrate the value of landing troops by parachute to achieve surprise and rapid accumulation of attacking forces. Churchill himself ordered the creation of a new corps of 5,000 troops trained in airborne assault to land by parachute or via gliders in occupied territory.
Although initially promising as an amphibious landing, the local landscape ultimately required that the raid on Bruneval be accomplished by airborne forces. Landing by parachute within a narrow drop zone, the raiders would establish a defensive perimeter to allow German radar technology to be dismantled and removed by trained specialists, prior to extraction of all forces by sea with the captured equipment and any German prisoners with intimate knowledge of radar technology. The Bruneval raid therefore offered a prime opportunity to advance scientific intelligence on German capabilities, demonstrate the effectiveness of Combined Operations Command and airborne forces, and deliver a blow to the occupying enemy forces.
The raid took place over the night of 27-28 February 1942, taking into account weather conditions and the phases of the moon. The distribution of parachute landings was wider than anticipated, with some dropped two miles from the objective. Nevertheless, this logistical inconvenience ultimately proved beneficial, since it caused confusion among German officers as to the exact location and objectives of the raiders.
This confusion was further prompted by an exercise of Wehrmacht troops in the same location earlier in the evening, meaning that some observers mistook British paratroopers crossing the countryside for their German counterparts and did not raise the alarm. Heavy snow made movement hard going, and the necessary snow camouflage was not worn by the paratroopers. After a fierce firefight with local German troops, the raiders escaped as planned by sea with the radar equipment and some prisoners.
British casualties were relatively light, with two killed and eight wounded. Seven paratroopers who could not be extracted were taken into captivity, with all bar one surviving the war. Two were initially helped to escape the area by the French Resistance, and were smuggled towards Vichy via Paris, until they were captured, with their guides sent to concentration camps. Operation Biting provided useful intelligence on German radar capabilities, and demonstrated the realisation of Churchill’s vision for offensive raids into occupied territory.
On the raiders’ return, the Allied media trumpeted the audacity and courage of the raid, though the scientific rationale and outcomes were not disclosed. A raft of decorations was awarded to those involved in its planning and execution, including the aircrews who conveyed the paratroopers. Dr Jones was put forward for Companionship of the Order of the Bath, but this seems to have been thwarted by bureaucratic snobbery around his role as a scientific officer, and the honour was eventually only awarded in 1946. Operation Biting also prompted caution in the locations of British radar facilities and their vulnerabilities to airborne or amphibious assault assessed. From 1 August 1942, the War Office endorsed the creation of the Parachute Regiment, which maintains the ethos of the raiders of Bruneval to the present day.
Daring operation
Operation Biting offers an engaging example of a daring military operation undertaken by a host of compelling personalities at every stage of its gestation and execution. Yet the real significance of studying Biting in depth lies in the insight it provides into the complexity of the British war effort, and the diverse range of capabilities that could be mobilised by Churchill and his military chiefs.
The success of Biting was testament to the fighting abilities of the paratroopers and their resilience in light of changing conditions on the ground, but it also owes much to the brilliance of British scientific intelligence, the courage of French Resistance agents, the willingness of the Armed Services to pool expertise, and Churchill’s vision for offensive operations against German occupying forces. The success of the raid was therefore built on complex interweaving strands of British military and intelligence planning, with multiple individuals playing their part in the overall successful execution of the operation.
Throughout his narrative, Hastings highlights examples of ‘creative indiscipline’, where individuals or small groups chose to contravene regulations or operate beyond their existing authority in order to deliver results. A good example of this approach can be found in Tony Hill, the pilot who assumed personal responsibility for securing high-quality aerial photographs of Bruneval. Hill did so by disregarding standard operating procedures that prohibited multiple attempts on the same target. These images, obtained at great personal risk, supported the theoretical rationale for the raid on Bruneval.
This book provides a fast-paced and engrossing account of the planning, execution, and aftermath of Operation Biting, set within the wider context of the British military and intelligence machine. It is essential reading for anyone interested in how Churchill’s ambitions for raids on the coastline of occupied Europe were realised through the lens of a single remarkable operation.
Operation Biting: the 1942 parachute assault to capture Hitler’s radar
Max Hastings
William Collins, hbk, 384pp (£25)
ISBN 978-0008642167
