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REVIEW BY JONATHAN EATON
Sir Max Hastings has an established reputation as a leading writer on 20th-century conflicts, drawing on his previous experience as both a war correspondent and newspaper editor. His recent works have included studies of Vietnam and the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as a series of well-received treatments on aspects of the Second World War. His latest book returns to that period with a focus on the 1942 commando raid codenamed Operation Biting.
The context of this raid lies in Winston Churchill’s enthusiasm for the use of new forces and tactics to maintain the pressure on German occupying forces on mainland Europe, even after the withdrawal at Dunkirk. This was famously outlined in a memorandum from Churchill to his chief of staff, Major General Hastings ‘Pug’ Ismay, dated 4 June 1940, in which the then-Prime Minister argued emphatically for learning the lessons of the Dunkirk evacuation. Churchill was keen on the potential of forces that could be rapidly deployed, withdrawn, and then redeployed in an offensive manner in order to confuse and harass the enemy.
Part of Churchill’s genius, particularly during the darkest periods of the conflict from a British perspective, lay in his active encouragement of his military commanders to see beyond the immediate threat and use unorthodox approaches to gain an advantage. As Churchill articulated shortly after, he sought plans for ‘a vigorous, enterprising, and ceaseless offensive against the whole German-occupied coastline’. This approach would not only keep German forces in a state of confusion and imbalance, but it would also serve to shore up British morale. It is noteworthy that Operation Biting itself took place in the same month as the surrender of Singapore and the evasion by German battlecruisers of the Royal Navy in the so-called ‘Channel Dash’, a period where good news was anxiously sought by the British military command.
Bringing Churchill’s vision to life required the creation of a new Combined Operations function, ultimately led by Lord Louis Mountbatten. Combined Ops was created to draw together the necessary talent, resources, and matériel to launch raids on the coast of occupied Europe, through liaison with the existing armed forces and intelligence services. As a new entity with a radical approach to fighting the war, the existence of Combined Ops was a source of political tension at the highest levels of the military, not helped in the least by a lack of confidence in some quarters in the proposed approach. Churchill’s appointment of Mountbatten explicitly created a leader with the political connections, reputation, and charisma to drive the concept forward and deliver results.
The Chief of Combined Operations was utterly reliant on the resources provided (sometimes grudgingly) by the Armed Services, and therefore successful leadership required the ability to influence and persuade at the highest levels. Mountbatten’s political connections, stemming from his relationship with the royal family, were exceptionally broad. Indeed, the German Luftwaffe officer responsible for the radar installation targeted by Biting was a distant cousin of Mountbatten, a descendant of Queen Victoria, and grandson of the last Kaiser.
Bruneval identified
In the early years of the war, suspicions began to grow among some members of the British scientific intelligence community that German radar capabilities were advancing significantly. At the heart of this theory was Dr R V Jones, Assistant Director of Intelligence (Science) at the Air Ministry. With a deep passion for scientific research into radar, Jones was well connected across the wider intelligence community and a firm advocate of the use of science to further the Allied war effort. Using his access to aerial photography of German installations and signal intercepts, Jones theorised that the enemy’s radar capabilities were at risk of matching or exceeding those of Britain.
Further intensive aerial photography collation and analysis identified the area at Bruneval in Normandy as a potential site for a raid to recover key components of a German radar system, owing to its proximity to the coast and natural topography. Local intelligence on the composition and deployment of forces and defensive features was also secured through considerable personal bravery by agents of the French Resistance.
