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THE MANY MYTHS OF MONTY
Describing Field Marshal Montgomery as ‘indispensable’ in your special article on him (MHM October/November 2022) perpetuates the myth that Montgomery himself did so much to establish.
From October 1942 onwards, his leadership had accrued enough tactical and strategic errors to have ended the career of most other generals.

First was the arguably needless (and probably politically motivated) Second Battle of El Alamein. Rommel’s drive to the Suez Canal had, thanks to General Auchinleck, already been stopped, and following Operation Torch, it was only a matter of time before the Axis forces in North Africa withered on the vine.
And yes, heavy rains did hamper the Eighth Army’s pursuit, but they equally hampered the enemy’s retreat (something, I suspect, that was an inconvenient truth for Montgomery).
Moving forward to 1944, there was the delay in capturing Caen, and of course the disastrous Operation Market Garden. But Montgomery’s failure to clear the Scheldt Estuary once Antwerp had been captured was a strategic blunder of enormous proportions, quite possibly lengthening the war itself.
David Flintham Romford, Essex
