Subscribe now for full access and no adverts
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Thank you for your excellent coverage of D-Day to mark its 80th anniversary. By focusing on the ‘untold stories’ of the event, you’ve revealed some really interesting material.
Another story which has yet to be fully told is that of history’s first large-scale ‘Electronic Warfare’ assault, on the night of 5-6 June 1944.
Radar was key to the Atlantic Wall defences, and the Allied air and naval attacks on them could have come badly unstuck if the Germans had received prior warning through their radar. The Nazis invested heavily in two complementary radar systems: Freya (a long-range – 120 miles – air search radar, pictured) and Würzburg (a highly accurate targeting radar with a range of 43 miles).
The British radar expert Professor R V Jones identified more than 100 German radar sites along the French and Belgian coasts, many of which were destroyed in rocket attacks by RAF Typhoons.
But, in a major operation, seven RAF squadrons, 803 Bomb Squadron of the USAAF, and two motor launch (ML) flotillas of the Royal Naval Reserve were tasked with blanking out all the surviving German radar stations on the night before D-Day.
This they did using a combination of airborne and shipborne jammers. The RAF dropped large quantities of aluminium strips cut to the lengths needed to jam both Freya and Würzburg. Other aircraft used a broadband jammer, called ‘Mandrel’, targeted at Würzburg, and another jammer, ‘Airborne Cigar’ or ‘ABC’, targeted at the German Air Force VHF ground-to-air fighter control frequencies.
The operation left the German Air Force and Navy both blind and deaf, unable to use their radar or communicate with their fighters. This was an essential precondition for the success of D-Day.
Andrew Webster, Keighley, West Yorkshire
FORREST’S CAREER
Edmund West’s article about Nathan Bedford Forrest (MHM December 2023/January 2024) gave an overview of his years fighting for the Confederacy. However, I would take issue with the way it also dwelled on negative aspects of Forrest’s career and aligned them with other wickedness of that era.
After the 1864 Battle of Fort Pillow, for instance, many black and white Union soldiers were killed by Forrest’s men. But, although any slaughter of captured soldiers is terrible, it should be noted that such behaviour was not uncommon at the time – as any student of Wellington’s 1812 capture of Badajoz would agree.
Similarly, the article mentioned prisoner exchange – the point being that the Confederate Army did not participate in them, as they would not give up captured black Union soldiers. In reality, however, the situation was again more complicated. In 1864, Confederate officials approached General Butler (Union Commissioner of Exchange) to exchange prisoners, including black soldiers, but General Grant refused as he felt those Confederate POWs would fight the Union again.
Such examples are emblematic of a one-sided view of Forrest’s career, of the Civil War, and its aftermath. But portraying him simply as a man who hated black people is very far from the truth. In 1875, Forrest spoke to a black fraternal organisation saying, ‘Go to work, be industrious, live honestly, and truly, and when you are oppressed, I’ll come to your relief.’
Andrew L H Hyatt, Greer, South Carolina
FACING REALITIES
In his recent letter (‘Precision raids’, MHM June/July 2024), Rod Sanders says he was irritated by Taylor Downing’s reference to the ‘carpet or indiscriminate bombing’ of Bomber Command. In defence of Downing, I would say the majority of Bomber Command’s missions did employ area-bombing tactics, simply because of an inability to hit targets precisely. The RAF adopted a policy of ‘dehousing’ – the targeting of the workforce within the civilian population. Bombloads were designed to cause the maximum destruction to dwellings.
As for the British tactics adopted by the US Twentieth Air Force over Japan, I would suggest these were not precision techniques but area-bombing tactics used by Bomber Command. Incendiaries were used to target Japanese cities with devastating consequences. More civilians died in the bombing of Tokyo (pictured) than in the atom-bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As the commander of the Twentieth Air Force, Curtis LeMay, said: ‘I suppose if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal.’
I am not attempting to pass moral judgement, but the realities of the bombing campaign do need to be faced.
Simon Davidson, London
LAST STAND
Thank you for your recent article on Beecher Island (MHM April/May 2024), which provided a concise summary of this minor but remarkable battle in the long war for North America. Visitors today can still see the battlefield, a pleasant oasis in the rolling plains. The island itself, however, washed away in floods some decades ago.
About 80 miles south-east of Beecher Island is Fort Wallace, once a very active combat base. As the article said, it was to Fort Wallace that Major Forsyth’s request for help was sent. Back then, and without horses, it was a journey that took four days.
James Ross (US Army, ret’d), via email
Please note: letters may be edited for length; views expressed here are those of our readers, and do not necessarily reflect those of the magazine.
Images: www.themoviedb.org/Wikimedia Commons
You must be logged in to post a comment.