Description
In this issue:
– Codes and ciphers – Code-breaking in Bletchley Park. How did you become a Bletchley boffin? What was it like to get the call? Renowned historian Asa Briggs talks to MHM about his wartime service as a code-breaker, and we lift the lid on the secret world of spooks and ciphers.
– History of the British Army -Saratoga, 13 September – 17 October 1777. What did the British Army learn from its disastrous encounter with American rebels in the wooded wilderness of the Hudson Valley?
– The fall of Singapore – ‘The worst disaster and capitulation in British history’. Colonel Ronnie McCrum takes a critical look at a battle that was lost before the war began.
– Ireland, AD 1169-1171 -The other Norman conquest. Military historian Jeffrey James discovers the deep roots of Britain’s ‘Irish Problem’ -in the Norman conquest launched a century after the Battle of Hastings.
– The war of the flea -Cyprus, 1955-1958. Regular MHM contributor David Sloggett analyses the Greek-Cypriot War of Liberation.
Plus: news, reviews, museums, opinion columns, and much more!
From the Editor:
How important is military intelligence to the outcome of war?
That it is one of the essential dimensions of armed conflict is beyond doubt. It is desirable to know as much as possible about the capability, location, and intentions of the enemy. It is equally desirable to minimise enemy knowledge of yourself; indeed, so far as possible, to implant false information.
The work of the British decryption centre at Bletchley Park in cracking the Enigma codes used by the Germans during the Second World War may represent the most comprehensive intelligence triumph in military history. But how much difference did it make?
The list of failures despite foreknowledge is very long. In the spring of 1941, for example, Stalin ignored London’s warnings about Hitler’s impending invasion of Russia, and General Freyberg failed to organise an effective defence of Crete against an airborne assault he had been told was coming.
Secret intelligence, to affect operations, has to pass through four stages: interception, decryption, interpretation, and counter-action. Problems can occur at any stage, and in the passage from one stage to another.
Stalin simply did not believe the British because he did not trust them. The Bletchley boffins failed to pass on crucial information about German objectives, again on Crete.
Even when information is correctly handled, intelligence victories may not alter the military balance if other factors outweigh the advantage conferred. The capability to frustrate known enemy intentions may simply not exist.
Nonetheless, the work of the Bletchley code-breakers represents an astonishing intelligence triumph based on brilliant mathematical reasoning, pioneering computer technology, and superb organisation and diligence.
The recent publication of a Bletchley memoir by top academic historian Asa Briggs, who served in Hut 6 during the war, is a fitting occasion to celebrate the achievement and explore the role of intelligence in war.
Cover Date: Feb-2012, Volume 2 Issue 5