On the face of it, Operation Barbarossa – Nazi Germany’s 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union – is straightforward to understand. Germany was at first strikingly successful, then faltered, and ultimately failed to subdue the Soviets, leading to rout and ruin. And yet Barbarossa has long fascinated historians beyond its apparent facts. As Max Hastings has observed, more than 90% of all German soldiers died on the Russian front. In other words, understanding Barbarossa is key to understanding WWII as a whole.
Reading the many histories of Barbarossa, one question comes up time and again: why did Germany, so successful in dominating Europe early in the war, fail disastrously in Russia? Timothy Manion’s book enters this debate with confidence. It is weighty in appearance and densely argued, with chapters devoted to military theory, the operation timeline, and the respective armies, and the whole is supported by an array of maps. Manion argues two main points. First, that we need to go back to individuals, in particular the generals, rather than rely on the view that overextended supply lines, the Russian climate, or a delayed start to the invasion were to blame for failure. Second, that it was not so much Germany that lost, but the Red Army that won.
To take the second argument first: much writing on Barbarossa is highly critical of failed Blitzkrieg and Hitler’s inept strategising, to the exclusion of taking the Soviets seriously. At the same time, the Soviet side has either been inflated, mistold, or simply left unrecorded. The paper trail in Russia is often closed off in its archives, or a poor reflection of what actually happened.
