By 1916, the Tsar’s armies were very different from the brave but ill-equipped forces of 1914. Despite widespread corruption and inefficiency, Russia’s war industries had massively expanded: artillery production was approaching 900 guns and more than 2,500,000 shells per month. The dire rifle shortages of 1914-1915 had been overcome, and all 2,000,000 frontline troops were fully armed. Battlefield communications had also significantly improved: the 1914 holdings of 10,000 field telephones had risen to 50,000 two years later.
The real problem lay in utilising this equipment effectively. The higher echelons of the Russian command structure were bedevilled by inefficiency, with far too many generals appointed on the basis of their popularity at the Imperial Court rather than any military ability. There were some exceptions, however – most notably General Aleksei Brusilov, a veteran of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, who had commanded the 8th Army with considerable skill since 1914. On 29 March 1916, he was promoted to command the South-west Front (7th, 8th, 9th, and 11th Armies), which stretched along a front line of more than 600km (370 miles) across Ukraine, from what is now southern Belarus to northern Romania.
At 62, Brusilov, who was himself the son of a Russian general, had become a thoroughly efficient and professional commander. This sometimes put him at odds with his fellow officers, and tended to reinforce his reputation as a loner – someone who never quite fitted in with the routines and expectations of the Imperial Court. Unlike most of his contemporaries, he was not a graduate of the General Staff Academy, and he had always believed in the value of ‘preparedness’ – training his men for the realities of combat. Brusilov was convinced that the Russian soldier could fight well, if properly led, and strove to eradicate the brutal discipline common in other units.
