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Hideki Tojo was Japan’s most important policymaker of WWII. As detailed in Gary Bass’s 2023 study Judgment at Tokyo, he was the highest official to face the death penalty at the ensuing war-crimes trials. Yet apart from Robert Butow’s Tojo and the Coming of the War, published in 1961, until now there has been no full-length biography. Peter Mauch fills that gap, using source materials that have become newly available over the decades.
Tojo exercised wide powers as Japan’s Prime Minister and War Minister from October 1941 until his dismissal in July 1944. He was ruthless and autocratic by nature. Yet he was never a war leader in the mould of Hitler or Mussolini, with ultimate authority to determine grand strategy. He owed his position to his influence with Emperor Hirohito, to whom he remained stubbornly loyal, even to the point of shielding his master from blame during his trial.
Mauch depicts a dutiful, industrious individual who never overcame the challenges posed by Japan’s dysfunctional command structure. Towards the end of his time in office, he tried to resolve tensions between the Army General Staff and the War Ministry by taking on the role of Chief of Staff himself. Yet he continued to operate as if these were separate roles, even to the extent of working out of different offices.
Tojo was the archetypal military bureaucrat, focused on detail, forever filling notebooks with plans. As the war turned against Japan, he tried to balance the demands of the armed services with those of the national economy. Yet this believer in ‘total war’ never evolved an overall vision of how to conduct the struggle with the US. He was an opportunist, adjusting his position in response to events without grasping the bigger picture.
So, how much responsibility does Tojo bear for the tumultuous decade and a half that culminated in Japan’s 1945 defeat? The staged attack on the South Manchuria railway in September 1931, which paved the way for the Japanese invasion of China, is often seen as the work of rogue elements independent of the Tokyo government. But Mauch shows Tojo was part of a group of officers in the capital who actively connived at the incident. He consistently favoured aggressive policies when he judged they could promote Japanese interests.
Tojo revealed himself as a skilled political operator in the 1930s. He was careful to oppose the doomed coup attempt by young officers in February 1936. But a year later, as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, he ignored the authorities to bring about an escalation of the conflict in northern China and inner Mongolia. He was in pole position to take the premiership shortly before the outbreak of the Pacific War.
Tojo was the key figure pushing for a pre-emptive war against the US in 1941. Yet the divided nature of the high command meant he never gained executive control over the navy. He was informed of the Pearl Harbor operation just a week in advance. Nevertheless, Tojo was undoubtedly the moving spirit in Japan’s bid to create the so-called ‘Greater East Asia Co Prosperity Sphere’. Removed from office after the fall of Saipan, he remained unrepentant. Even after the dropping of the atomic bombs in August 1945, he favoured continued resistance and had to be overruled by the emperor.
Readers who are primarily interested in Japan’s military campaigns in China and the Pacific should be aware that they form the background, not the central focus, of Mauch’s study. But for anyone seeking a better understanding of imperial Japan’s decision-making processes and the part they played in its defeat, this book is highly recommended.
REVIEW BY GRAHAM GOODLAD
Tojo: the rise and fall of Japan’s most controversial World War II general
Peter Mauch
Belknap Press, hbk, 512pp (£27.95)
ISBN 978-0674495197
