War Classics – On the Psychology of Military Incompetence

Nick Spenceley reconsiders On the Psychology of Military Incompetence by Norman Dixon.

As Norman Dixon frequently asserts in On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (1976), war is a risky, high-stakes gamble, with fearful consequences for failure – so why dwell on the failures of a few unfortunate individuals? Well, we are still fascinated by events so catastrophic they seem to defy all human logic: the retreat from Kabul in 1842, the Battle of Spion Kop, the Siege of Kut, the fall of Singapore in 1942, and many others. What leads intelligent men to turn their backs on common sense and wise advice, and to drag their unfortunate troops stubbornly into massacre or captivity, actively rejecting every opportunity to save them? If we can’t single out stupidity, age, and other external factors, can we find common psychological explanations?

Dixon’s qualifications for writing this book are twofold, first as a former officer in the Royal Engineers, and second as a psychology academic. Military history was not his background, and Part 1 of his text, which details a series of military disasters, relies heavily on the popular sources of the day, such as the works of Cecil Woodham-Smith, Alan Clark, and Cornelius Ryan (all previously featured in this column). The various command failures are described with gusto, and subsequent research has often given a more nuanced account of the leaders involved. Nevertheless, Dixon gets his point across – that these sorry episodes share certain features, including a stubborn clinging to tradition, rejection of unpalatable information, underestimation of the enemy, indecisiveness, persistence in actions that are patently failing, and reliance on brute force and frontal assaults. The debacle at Arnhem in 1944, for example, illustrates all these faults except perhaps the first.

Particular personalities

It is the psychological explanations for the events described that make this a pioneering work. These cover both the behaviour of individuals and the collective mindset of military institutions. Central to Dixon’s argument is that certain types of individual are attracted to the military, and their participation perpetuates a particular culture, which in turn attracts more individuals of the same type. This discourages the elevation of the more original and maverick types who are often needed to achieve real success.

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