REVIEW BY JONATHAN EATON
The legacy of the Vietnam War continues to haunt American policymakers for the example it provides of a major power drawn gradually yet inexorably into a grinding conflict with no clear pathway for withdrawal. Claiming to be the first single-volume, comprehensive military history of the conflict, this new treatment is by Professor Geoffrey Wawro, Director of the Military History Center at the University of North Texas and the author of previous studies on US involvement in the Middle East and the First World War in Europe.
Wawro takes a deliberately long view in charting the US involvement in Vietnam, from Eisenhower’s decision-making following the withdrawal of French forces after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 through to the fall of Saigon in 1975. Recognising the validity of Clausewitz’s dictum on the relationship between war and politics, he frames the escalation of the conflict through a political lens, particularly through gradual decisions made by the respective administrations of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon.
Initially American policymakers viewed the conflict as necessary in preventing the spread of Communism across south-east Asia, but this desire to avoid being perceived as ideologically ‘soft’ ultimately contributed to ongoing military escalation. Additionally, the ensuing accumulation of US casualties made withdrawal without victory a political impossibility. The sheer scale of US economic and military power blinded consecutive administrations to the danger of fighting a politically committed and agile enemy in terrain of their choosing. South Vietnamese leaders often proved corrupt or overly concerned with internal power struggles, rather than offering inspirational leadership to their people or troops, further hampering US efforts to reduce their own active involvement in the conflict.
War Classics – Bugles and a Tiger