REVIEW BY DAVID PORTER
Although the often-forgotten Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 was launched by the French Empire of Napoleon III, the truly central figure in the conflict – as the title of this new book by historian Rachel Chrastil suggests – was Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. In the opening chapters, Chrastil summarises how Bismarck’s earlier wars against Denmark and Austria had already given Prussia a dominant position in Germany, by absorbing the territories of Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Nassau, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Homburg, and Frankfurt. All the remaining states north of the Main were part of a Prussian-dominated North German Confederation, leaving Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt as the only German states with any real sovereignty.
With Germany expanding at such an aggressive rate, it was clear that conflict with France was only a matter of time. Tension increased as Napoleon III’s attempts to follow up Bismarck’s deliberately vague hints about territorial concessions in the Rhineland and Luxembourg in 1866/1867 provoked the south German states into agreeing to put their armies under Prussian command in the event of war with France. Prussia now had the equivalent of a further three army corps on mobilisation, bringing her total manpower to virtually twice that of the French.
However, even when France declared war on 19 July 1870, there was still considerable mistrust between Prussia and the south German states, especially Bavaria, a mistrust that manifested itself in the form of cartography. As the author notes, ‘Bavaria and the other south German states were under such suspicion that Moltke, the Prussian commander-in-chief, did not allow their officers below the rank of general to have Prussia’s high-quality 1:80,000 maps (they were given only 1:250,000-scale maps).’
John Wesley Gilbert (1863-1923)