The Battle for Crete: 20 May-1 June 1941

This is part two of the Special on the Battle for Crete. You can read the first part, about the history of the German 7th Airborne Division, here.

British intelligence knew of an impending German airborne assault on Crete. Churchill was determined to hold the island for both strategic and political reasons, and he appointed General Freyberg to overall command of what came to be called ‘Creforce’.

This was an unfortunate choice. Freyberg was a brave soldier, popular with his men, and an old friend of Churchill’s. But appointment to the supreme command came as both a surprise and a disappointment. He wanted to return to Egypt to train and re-equip his division, and he had no confidence that the island could be defended. He told General Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, that ‘there were not enough men on Crete to hold it’ and that therefore ‘the holding of Crete should be reconsidered’.

This assessment – as was clear at the time and has been ever since – was wrong. One can only assume that Freyberg had been promoted to a level of responsibility that triggered a crisis of confidence. Though he came around – accepting the burden imposed on him – he failed to provide effective military leadership.