Too many historians of the Napoleonic Wars make two false assumptions. The first is that Trafalgar ended the threat of an invasion of Britain and any challenge to the Royal Navy’s domination of the seas. The second is that the Peninsular Campaign was the government’s sole focus on land. In fact, the powerful expeditions to the Dutch coast in the summer of 1809 constituted Britain’s main effort, designed to reinforce Nelson’s success in 1805 and, at the same time, strike at the heart of Napoleon’s strategy in Central Europe.
After the repulse of the Corunna expedition in 1808, followed by a bold start to further operations in Portugal in May 1809, decisions had to be made about where the next major thrust would be.
Fewer than 20,000 troops were keeping the French off-balance in distant Iberia, and Sicily was holding its own. But new enemy ships were being built with worrying speed in the Scheldt and troops appeared to be massing again for an invasion, allowing Napoleon to brag that his fleets in Flushing and Antwerp were ‘holding a pistol to the head of England’.
